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Bartlett v English Cricket Board Association of Cricket Officials (CC (Wolverhampton))
*P.N. 77 Introduction
At first glance, the recent judgment delivered by HHJ Lopez in Bartlett v English Cricket Board
Association of Cricket Officials, 1 appears unremarkable. This is a first instance decision, made in the
County Court at Birmingham, thereby lacking the authority of a higher court judgment and, somewhat
straightforwardly, merely reinforcing the fact that the ordinary principles of the law of negligence are
applicable in the context of sport.2 Claimants suffering personal injury caused by the carelessness of
defendants may bring an action in negligence where the alleged breach of duty was committed by
co-participants;3 coaches;4 instructors;5 and, of direct relevance to Bartlett, officials and referees.6
What is arguably more remarkable is the number of recent reported cases where the reasonableness
of the conduct of amateurs, or volunteers, was a determining legal issue. For instance, cases
involving a sports coach,7 scout leaders,8 rugby referees,9 and now, cricket umpires. No doubt, for
many enthusiasts and purists of the frequently termed "gentleman's game', traditionally underpinned
by the ethos of muscular Christianity, suing a cricket umpire for personal injury may be regarded as
repugnant - "It's just not cricket'.
Nevertheless, since the functions of cricket officials require special skill, not ordinarily possessed by
the average reasonable person on top of the "Clapham omnibus', the legal principles of professional
liability would appear to be applicable when determining liability in negligence. In citing Bolam v Friern
Hospital Management Committee, 10 and Bolitho v City of Hackney Health Authority, 11 this certainly
appears to be the approach adopted by HHJ Lopez in Bartlett when fashioning the legal test, or
standard of care, incumbent on the two *P.N. 78 umpires. Curiously, in Bartlett, it would appear that
the court was essentially tasked with determining what might be termed the "professional liability of an
amateur'.12
Facts
This was a Warwickshire Cricket League Second Division match played between Moseley Ashfield
Cricket Club and Solihull Municipal Cricket Club on 7 July 2012. The standard of play was high, but all
of the players were amateur. In short, the umpires, faced with conflicting representations made by the
opposing team captains/vice-captain, and in accordance with the Laws of Cricket,13 were responsible
for deciding if play should proceed following a period of heavy rain. Interestingly, one of the umpires
was a qualified English Cricket Board (ECB) level 2 umpire at the time of the accident, the other
umpire holding the lower level 1 qualification. As part of their duties and responsibilities as presiding
officials, the umpires inspected the cricket ground (the square, the infield and outfield), and following
a delayed start and change of square, ultimately concluded that the conditions were safe to allow play
to proceed. On the fifth ball of the first over, the claimant executed a "sliding stop' when fielding,
suffering injury to his left leg when performing this technique. By particulars of claim, dated 9 October
2013, the claimant alleged that his accident was caused or contributed to by the negligence of the
umpires.14 Since the two umpires were members of the defendant, the English Cricket Board
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Association of Cricket Officials accepted that it would be vicariously liable in respect of the alleged
tortious acts or omissions of the umpires in the course of their umpiring the match in question.15
Decision
HHJ Lopez heard this case on 9, 10 and 31 July 2015, before handing down judgment on 27 August
2015. The judge concluded that:
"the decision that it was safe to play - albeit on a different square and with a delayed start, was their
own [the umpires] and reached after a careful and considered evaluation of all of the relevant factors
… In short, it was neither dangerous nor unreasonable to sanction play because of the state of the
outfield'.16
Further, in ruling that the condition of the outfield was not a material contributing factor, or the cause
of the claimant's injury, the court held that the claimant's incorrect technique when conducting the
"sliding stop', being contrary to safe practice, caused his injury.17
*P.N. 79 Commentary
The reasoning of the court in Bartlett is detailed, cogent and convincing. Moreover, it is contended
that the judgment of HHJ Lopez presents a sensible answer to an unresolved question posed by
Vowles v Evans. In delivering the Court of Appeal's judgment in Vowles, Lord Phillips MR stated:
"There is scope for argument as to the extent to which the degree of skill to be expected of a referee
depends upon the grade of the referee or of the match that he has agreed to referee. In the course of
argument it was pointed out that sometimes in the case of amateur sport, the referee fails to turn up,
or is injured in the course of the game, and a volunteer referee is called for from the spectators. In
such circumstances the volunteer cannot reasonably be expected to show the skill of one who holds
himself out as referee, or perhaps even to be fully conversant with the laws of the game.'18
This raises two significant points of interest on which analysis of Bartlett may prove instructive. First,
the decision of the umpires regarding the playing conditions at the time was made jointly. Although
not suggested by counsel for the claimant, following Vowles there may have been some scope to
argue that the standard of care owed by the level 2 umpire was higher than that owed by the level 1
umpire. Unattractively, this implies variable standards of care in the same circumstances. In sensibly
discounting such a possible submission, HHJ Lopez stated that:
"[t]here is no suggestion the standard of care which [the level 2 umpire] owed was higher than that
owed by [the level 1 umpire] as he was a more experienced and better qualified umpire. … both
[were] qualified umpires with more than adequate qualifications and experience to umpire the match
in question in the second division of the Warwickshire Cricket League'.19
The emphasis by the circuit judge appears to be on the level of the particular competition in question
and for the umpires to be ordinarily competent for the specific demands of the precise role or post.
Following Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority, 20 this approach appears correct.
Secondly, though perhaps intended to provide reassurance to volunteers involved in the provision
and delivery of sporting activities, the second limb of Lord Phillips' statement in Vowles, concerning
volunteers in amateur sport, appears problematic. This seems to conceal the fact that an individual
assuming a duty requiring the exercise of a special skill would, in fact, be subject to the ordinary
principles of the law of negligence if sued. In short, an individual volunteering to step in at short notice
to referee, in an effort *P.N. 80 to prevent cancellation of a fixture, would appear to be under a duty
to do so properly.21 As such, the principles of professional liability would essentially be engaged,
regardless of whether or not the defendant may be an amateur. In citing the following passage from
Bolam, the court's judgment in Bartlett would appear to concur with this submission:
"[W]here you get the situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then the
test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top of the
Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary
skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest
expert skill; it is well established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary
competent man exercising that particular art.'22
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Further, although the threshold of negligence liability for sports officials will be a high one, recognising
that the specific circumstances of sport will often require officials to make decisions in the context of
"a fast moving and vigorous contest',23 this is by no means conclusive. For instance, scrutiny of the
full factual matrix of Bartlett revealed that the umpires could take as long as they deemed necessary
to reach a balanced and considered decision. Accordingly, in the circumstances of this case,24 the
threshold of liability was "far more readily crossed than in the context of [a] split second decision
made in the course of a fast moving game'.25
Concluding remarks
This is a robust judgment offering some further clarity regarding the intersection between the law of
negligence and sports officiating (and coaching). Indeed, the court's detailed analysis should prove
instructive to legal practitioners, national governing bodies of sport, and individual officials.
Significantly, this County Court decision provides a stark reminder to amateur volunteers in sport of
the importance of assuming tasks only at levels commensurate with their qualifications and
experience and, being mindful of potential limitations. Simply applied, the standard of skill and care
exercised by, for instance, (often volunteer) officials and coaches, should be consistent with that
expected of the ordinarily competent official or coach in the same circumstances.
Importantly, since games are "obviously desirable activities within the meaning of section 1 of the
Compensation Act 2006',26 it is somewhat curious why section 1 was not engaged in this case. This is
especially surprising given the Senior Executive Officer called on behalf of the defendant highlighted
that, "[t]he amateur game is short of officials with many games not served by qualified officials and so
those who officiate are to be *P.N. 81 treasured and not pilloried'.27 Correspondingly, it will be
interesting to note the impact of the recently enacted Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act
2015 on this emerging area of the law. On its facts, Bartlett would have provided an interesting test
case for interpretation by the courts of the somewhat ambiguous and opaque wording of the 2015 Act
regarding "the benefit of society' and a "predominantly responsible approach'. Nonetheless, thanks to
the common sense approach adopted by HHJ Lopez, following a highly successful cricketing
summer, the ECB will probably regard this decision as representing another instance where "cricket
won'.
Neil Partington
School of Law, Queen's University, Belfast
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